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The Shrinking Gains from Trade: 







Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models of world trade, often presented as 
demonstrating the benefits of trade liberalization, now make much more modest forecasts 
than they did just a few years ago. The estimated benefits are not only small in the 
aggregate, but also skewed toward developed countries; the expected contribution of 
trade liberalization to economic development and poverty alleviation is extremely 
limited. Related calculations, for the expected benefits of services liberalization, trade 
facilitation measures, and long-term productivity gains from trade liberalization, remain 
problematical and/or speculative. The empirical limitations of CGE forecasts rest on 
broader theoretical weaknesses: the models are largely locked within a static framework, 
and remarkably assume that trade policy causes no changes in total employment, up or 
down. Models built on more adequate theories, which have only begun to appear, would 








In the months leading up to trade negotiations, estimates of the economic gains 
from trade liberalization suddenly become newsworthy. The numbers produced by 
massive “computable general equilibrium” (CGE) trade models seem to answer an 
important and difficult question: what will be the economic effects of further trade 
liberalization – on the world as a whole, on individual countries, and on industries, 
regions, and population subgroups within countries? The results of complex modeling 
exercises are typically reported as if they were hard, objective facts, providing 
unambiguous numerical measures of the value of liberalization. Discussion of these 
reports often suggests that the sheer size of the estimates itself makes a powerful case for 
liberalization. 
 
This paper argues that the dominant interpretation of the leading trade models is 
mistaken on at least three grounds. First, in contrast to the situation just a few years ago, 
the best-known, most widely discussed CGE models now make surprisingly small 
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estimates of the benefits of liberalization of merchandise trade, especially for developing 
countries. As a consequence, the estimated potential for free trade to reduce global 
poverty is also quite limited. Second, the larger estimates still being reported from some 
studies reflect speculative extensions of standard models, and/or very simple, separate 
estimates of additional benefit categories, not the core results of established modeling 
methodologies. Third, the modelers' simplifying assumptions often build in rigid, 
predetermined answers to some of the key questions that are of greatest interest to policy 
makers. Critical dimensions of the real-world impacts of trade on employment and 
growth are excluded by design, while detailed attention is focused on secondary 
economic effects. It should be possible to develop analyses that incorporate realistic 
employment impacts and adjustment effects of trade agreements; indeed, there are 
already a few promising initial steps in that direction. Such models would likely tell a 
story about winners and losers from trade quite different from the best-known current 
forecasts. 
 
More specifically, section 1 of this paper examines recent estimates of the 
benefits of trade liberalization from GTAP and from the World Bank's LINKAGE model, 
focusing on the distribution of overall benefits predicted by those models. The potential 
for poverty reduction resulting from trade liberalization is the subject of section 2.  
 
Turning to the extensions of standard approaches, section 3 reviews two 
innovations seen in the Brown-Deardorff-Stern (BDS) model, the effects of assuming 
increasing returns to scale in production, and the calculation of the benefits of liberalizing 
trade in services. Section 4 continues with two further innovations that have been 
important in recent discussion: estimates of the benefits of trade facilitation measures, 
and hypotheses about dynamic effects such as long run productivity gains from trade 
liberalization. Section 5 examines the theoretical framework of computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) models, which are used to model trade liberalization, and highlights 
some of the unrealistic features shared by most of the models – such as the assumption of 
fixed employment. A brief conclusion summarizes the major points of the paper. 
 
 
1. Forecasting the benefits of liberalization 
 
What a difference two years makes. In the discussion leading up to the WTO 
negotiations in Cancún in 2003, it was common to hear about the hundreds of billions of 
dollars of benefits available from trade liberalization. Exact numbers and definitions 
varied, but $500 billion of benefits to the developing world was a widely quoted figure. 
By 2005, leading up to the next round of negotiations in Hong Kong, it was difficult to 
find estimates of benefits to the developing world as high as $100 billion – and easy to 
find figures much lower than that. 
 
This section explores the projections of the benefits of merchandise trade 
liberalization made by the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model, the best-known 
and most widely used of the major trade models, and by the World Bank LINKAGE 





published in 2002-03 versus 2005. In both cases the later estimates of global benefits 
have fallen to about one third, and the benefits to developing countries have fallen to 
about one fifth, of their previous levels. 
 
Both of the newer studies appear as chapters in the same book, published by the 
World Bank in 2005. Both use the GTAP 6 database, describing the world economy as of 
2001 – the latest version of the standard database used by virtually all CGE trade models. 
Both incorporate trade agreements reached through 2005, including China's entry into the 
WTO, the expansion of the EU in 2004, and the end of the Multi-Fiber Agreement, in 
their baseline.  
 
Table 1. Benefits of complete liberalization, then and now 
      
Model  Year  benefits (billions of dollars) to 
   Developing  countries  World 
      
GTAP 2005  22  84 
GTAP 2002  108  254 
      
LINKAGE 2005  90  287 
LINKAGE 2003  539  832 
 
This updated data is a principal reason why GTAP and LINKAGE now predict 
much smaller gains from liberalization than they did only 2-3 years ago. As of 2002-
2003, the models used the GTAP 4 or 5 databases, describing the world as of 1995 or 
1997. Although some earlier forecasts attempted to look ahead and incorporate the 
expected effects of scheduled trade agreements, they did not completely anticipate the 
rapid pace of recent reduction in trade barriers, the rapid growth of East Asian 
economies, and other economic changes that affect the models.  
 
In the latest, updated models, the basic data is less out of date, and the world has 
less protectionism left to lose – so there are smaller benefits available from going the rest 
of the distance toward liberalization. One source of disagreement among forecasts, 
therefore, is that some of the larger numbers still circulating, including some discussed 
below, are based on older data sets which assume that there is more scope remaining for 
future liberalization. (The larger, earlier World Bank forecast shown in Table 1 also 
includes assumptions about future productivity gains from trade liberalization, a topic 




In their recent study, Thomas Hertel and Roman Keeney apply GTAP to estimate 
the benefits available from removal of all remaining barriers to merchandise trade (Hertel 
and Keeney 2005). As shown in Table 1, their estimate of the global benefits from full 
liberalization of merchandise trade is $84 billion. This is a modest benefit worldwide, 
equivalent to $14 per year, or $.04 per day, per capita. But as Hertel and Keeney show, it 






Most of the benefits, $55.7 billion, come from liberalization of agriculture; the 
great majority, $47.6 billion, results from liberalization in high-income countries. As 
shown in Table 2, more than 90% of the benefits of high-income agricultural 
liberalization come from improved import market access, i.e. elimination of tariffs and 
quotas. Most of the benefits of eliminating tariffs accrue to the high-income countries 
themselves, since their consumers are presumed to enjoy lower prices. (The 
corresponding losses to producers from lower prices are artificially minimized by the 
models, as explained in section 5.)  
 
Table 2. Benefits of high-income agricultural liberalization (GTAP) 
(millions of dollars) 
 
Beneficiary region 
      
high-income transition  developing  world 
Policy      
   
import market access  31,811 1,608 10,376  43,795
export subsidies  2,554 -488 -1,023  1,043
domestic support  2,450 76 284  2,810
Total 36,815 1,196 9,637  47,648
 
The benefits from eliminating high-income countries' export subsidies and 
domestic support are quite small, and are largely or entirely concentrated in the high-
income countries. Elimination of subsidies to high-income country exports is on balance 
a setback for developing countries, since it raises the prices paid by low income food-
importing countries. Elimination of domestic support policies in rich countries yields a 
numerically insignificant benefit to the developing world. The pattern is not unique to 
this study; a survey of earlier models by Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Charlton found four 
studies of the effects of eliminating OECD domestic support for agriculture and two 
studies of the effects of removing OECD export subsidies. All six estimated that these 
policies would represent a net loss of welfare for developing countries (Stiglitz and 
Charlton 2004). 
 
Turning to the aggregate benefits of complete liberalization, the numbers can be 
viewed in three different ways: as total amounts in billions of dollars; as per capita 
amounts, in dollars per person; and as percentages of GDP (see Table 3). High income 
countries come out ahead in total dollars and in per capita amounts, while developing 
countries do better in terms of percentage of GDP. However, neither rich nor poor 
countries as a whole stand to gain as much as 0.5% of GDP. 
 
As the first section of Table 3 shows, two thirds of the total global benefits result 
from the liberalization of agricultural trade; most of those benefits go to high-income 
countries. The benefits of liberalizing “other” (i.e., nontextile manufactures) are even 





countries capture most of the potential benefits. More than 70% of all benefits of 
liberalization, in all sectors, go to high-income countries.  
 
The contrast is even sharper in per capita terms, as the second part of Table 3 
shows: liberalization is worth $57 per person in the high-income world, versus less than 
$5 per person in the developing world. Agricultural liberalization is worth less than a 
penny per person per day for the developing world; all trade liberalization combined is 
worth just over a penny per person per day. In the high-income world, in contrast, all 
trade liberalization combined is worth more than 10 times as much per capita, nearly $.16 
per person per day. 
 
Table 3. Benefits of complete liberalization (GTAP) 
Liberalizing sector  Beneficiary region 
 high-income transition  developing  world 
     
  Total amounts, billions of dollars 
   
agriculture 41.6  2.2  11.9  55.7 
textiles  1.3 -0.2 8.8 9.8 
other 16.6  1.0  1.4  18.9 
total 59.5  2.8  22.1  84.3 
  
  Per capita, dollars per person 
   
agriculture  $40.00  $5.37 $2.54 $9.09 
textiles  $1.25 -$0.49 $1.88 $1.60 
other  $15.96  $2.44 $0.30 $3.08 
total $57.21  $6.83  $4.72  $13.75 
  
  Percentage of GDP 
   
agriculture  0.16% 0.25% 0.24% 0.18% 
textiles  0.01% -0.02% 0.18% 0.03% 
other  0.07% 0.11% 0.03% 0.06% 
total  0.23% 0.32% 0.44% 0.27% 
 
Evidence of trade liberalization differentially favoring developing countries is 
confined to the third part of Table 3. As a percentage of GDP, liberalization is indeed 
worth more to developing countries, according to Hertel and Keeney's estimates. The 
difference, amounting to 0.44% versus 0.23% of GDP, results almost entirely from the 
benefits of textile liberalization. These percentage gains are quite small, especially since 
they are one-time, not continuing, improvements; they are analogous to a single pay raise, 
not an annual rate of growth in wages. If trade liberalization were phased in over a 
number of years, the benefits would presumably be spread out as well, with even smaller 
annual gains. 





Within the developing world, not all countries benefit equally.  In fact, just five 
countries receive more than two thirds of benefits in every category, as shown in Table 4. 
Specifically, Argentina, Brazil, and India receive most of the benefits of agricultural 
liberalization to developing countries as a whole, while China and Vietnam receive most 
of the benefits of textile liberalization. These five countries also receive virtually all of 
the modest benefits of other liberalization to the developing world.  
 
The benefits to China and India appear large merely because they are such large 
countries. In per capita terms, both, especially India, receive less than the average for the 
developing world; in terms of percentage of GDP, they are both close to the average. For 
Argentina, Brazil, and Vietnam, however, the per capita benefits of liberalization are far 
above average, as is the share of GDP for Brazil and particularly Vietnam. 
 
Table 4.  Benefits for selected countries (GTAP) 
            
  billions of dollars    
  agriculture  textiles  other  total  per capita  % of GDP 
Argentina 1.2  0  0.1  1.3  $35.95  0.48% 
Brazil 5.0  0  0.2  5.1  $29.58  1.00% 
China 0.6  4.3  0.5  5.4  $4.25  0.46% 
India 1.3  0.2  0.2  1.7  $1.65  0.36% 
Vietnam   0  1.4  0.5  1.9  $23.90  5.81% 
      
other developing  3.8  2.9 -0.1 6.7 $3.15 0.24% 




The forecast by Kym Anderson et al. employs the World Bank's LINKAGE 
model, which is similar in design to GTAP but adds selected dynamic features, 
attempting to describe some types of changes over time (Anderson et al. 2005a). Starting 
from a 2001 base year, it estimates annual growth through 2015, including the assumed 
effects of trade negotiations. The estimate for global benefits in 2015 from complete 
liberalization, $287 billion, is more than three times Hertel and Keeney's estimate. 
However, Anderson et al. provide a reconciliation of the two studies. The biggest 
difference is that the world economy will presumably be much larger in 2015 than in 
2001. If the Anderson forecast was expressed as a percentage of GDP and applied to 
2001 data, it would amount to $156 billion, a little less than twice the GTAP estimate for 
that year. The remaining difference is due, in about equal measure, to the new dynamic 
assumptions added to the LINKAGE model, and to a recent revision of the model's 
elasticities (parameters that determine how fast the model responds to price changes).  
 
Although the absolute numbers are different, the distribution of benefits is broadly 
similar in the two studies, as shown in Table 5. For Anderson et al., as for Hertel and 
Keeney, about two thirds of the global benefits of complete liberalization are due to freer 





are enjoyed by the high-income countries. In per capita terms, Anderson et al. find that 
the benefit to developing countries is more than $17 per person per year, or almost $.05 
per person per day. In high-income countries, the benefit of complete liberalization would 
amount to nearly $200 per person per year, or $.53 per person per day.
1 
 
As a percentage of GDP, benefits are slightly greater to developing countries, 
0.8% of GDP versus 0.6% in high-income countries. In their text, Anderson et al. 
disingenuously quote a much higher figure for the benefit to developing countries, 1.2% 
of GDP. This is based on the category of developing countries as self-defined by WTO 
members, including Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, which are also counted 
as high-income countries by Anderson et al. Excluding those four countries, which are 
big winners from liberalization, the impact on developing countries, according to the 
detailed tables in Anderson et al., is 0.8% of GDP. Again, this is a one-time step increase, 
not a rate of growth that applies year after year. 
 
Table 5. Benefits of complete liberalization (LINKAGE) 
Liberalizing sector  Beneficiary region 
 high-income  developing  world 
    
Total amounts, billions of dollars 
agriculture 126  56  182 
textiles 14  24  38 
other 57  10  67 
total 197  90  287 
  
Per capita, dollars per person 
agriculture $124.48  $10.95  $29.70 
textiles $13.83  $4.69  $6.20 
other $56.31  $1.95  $10.93 
total $194.63  $17.59  $46.84 
  
Percentage of GDP in 2015 
agriculture 0.38%  0.50%  0.44% 
textiles 0.04%  0.21%  0.09% 
other 0.17%  0.09%  0.16% 
total 0.60%  0.80%  0.70% 
 
Benefits to the developing world are still concentrated in the hands of a few 
countries. The five countries that receive more than half of Hertel and Keeney's benefits 
to the developing world, Argentina, Brazil, China, India, and Vietnam, get only about one 
third of Anderson's comparable figure. However, if three other countries, Thailand, 
Mexico, and Turkey, are added to the list, half of Anderson's developing world benefits 





would benefit from increased rice exports following tariff reduction in Japan, Korea, and 
Taiwan. 
 
Anderson et al. also show the projected distribution of benefits among the high-
income countries. The striking pattern here is the comparative lack of benefits to the US 
and Canada. Some 85% of the benefits to high-income countries go to Europe, Japan, 
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. A principal form of benefits to high-income 
countries, in the models, is the increase in real income that consumers enjoy due to lower 
food prices when agricultural tariffs are eliminated. Therefore, the estimated benefits are 




All the estimates discussed so far are for complete elimination of all remaining 
barriers to merchandise trade, a proposal that is not currently on the table and does not 
seem likely to occur in the near term. Moving toward political realism, Anderson et al. 
explore scenarios for possible agreements under the Doha round of negotiations. The 
scenario they analyze at greatest length (their Scenario 7) calls for agricultural tariff rate 
reductions in developed countries of 45, 70, and 75 percent within three bands of existing 
tariffs, and reductions in developing countries of 35, 40, 50, and 60 percent within four 
bands of tariffs; the least developed countries are not required to make any reductions in 
agricultural tariffs. For nonagricultural tariff bindings the scenario calls for 50% cuts in 
developed countries, 33% in developing countries, and zero in the least developed 
countries. As shown in the first portion of Table 6, this scenario has projected benefits in 
2015 of $96 billion, about one third of the estimated value of full liberalization. 
 
Table 6. Benefits of "likely" Doha Round scenario  
Beneficiary region 
high-income developing  world 
    
LINKAGE      
Total amounts, billions of dollars  80  16  96 
Per capita, dollars per person  $79.04  $3.13  $15.67 
Percentage of GDP  0.24%  0.14%  0.23% 
    
GTAP -- extrapolated       
Total amounts, billions of dollars  24  4  28 
Per capita, dollars per person  $23.20  $0.84  $4.61 
Percentage of GDP  0.10%  0.08%  0.09% 
 
However, their “Doha scenario” does not simply reduce benefits to all parts of the 
world to one third of their maximum potential level. The differential pattern of 
liberalization tilts the benefits even more toward high-income countries. This is because 





countries; standard CGE models focus on the benefits to consumers of lower prices, 
while minimizing the impacts on producers (as explained in section 5). Under the Doha 
scenario, developing countries get 18% of their potential gains from full liberalization, or 
only $16 billion. Doha is worth about $3 per year, or less than a penny a day, for each 
person in the developing world. In contrast, high-income countries get 41% of their 
potential gains from full liberalization, amounting to $80 billion. Doha will mean a gain 
of $79 per year, or more than $.20 per day, for each person in high-income countries. 
Even as a percentage of GDP, the scenario favors affluent countries: it brings a projected 
(one-time) 0.24% increase in income to the developed world, versus 0.14% for 
developing countries.  
 
Once again, the benefits are distributed very unequally, with losses rather than 
gains resulting from the scenario in at least Mexico, Bangladesh, the Middle East, and 
much of Africa. Some of the losers under the Anderson Doha scenario are countries that 
already benefit from relatively liberalized trade. Mexico, for example, already enjoys 
open access to the US, its dominant export market, under NAFTA; with broader 
liberalization, Mexico might encounter stiffer competition in US markets. Likewise, 
Bangladesh and many African countries benefit from existing systems of trade 
preferences, and might face greater competition in a more liberalized future. 
 
Since Hertel and Keeney do not offer their own Doha scenario, the final portion 
of Table 6 extrapolates Anderson's Doha scenario into Hertel and Keeney's forecast. That 
is, it starts with the regional gains from complete liberalization according to Hertel and 
Keeney, then multiplies by the fraction of total gains available under the likely Doha 
scenario according to Anderson et al.: high-income countries get 41% of the gains Hertel 
and Keeney identified from complete liberalization, while developing countries get 18%. 
The result is an extremely small estimate of benefits, no more than $4 billion to the 
developing world as a whole. This is less than $1 per person per year, less than a quarter 
of a penny per person per day. Meanwhile, the developed countries receive $23 per 
person per year, more than $.06 per person per day. If this extrapolation is even 
approximately correct, the Hertel and Keeney forecast implies that the “likely” outcome 
of the Doha Round analyzed by Anderson et al. is of virtually no value to developing 
countries as a group. 
 
 
2. Modeling poverty reduction 
 
The CGE models used to analyze trade liberalization do not normally produce 
forecasts of income distribution or poverty reduction. Estimates of gains that might be 
received by developing countries include incomes that will be received both by the poor, 
and by other income groups and business interests in the same countries. The billions of 
dollars that would flow to Brazilian agriculture if trade were fully liberalized include 
gains both for the country's poorest rural workers, and for its wealthy ranchers, plantation 
owners, and agribusinesses. Additional hypotheses and analyses are required to translate 
gains for a nation, in Brazil or elsewhere, into impacts on poverty. 





Some models forecast the impact of trade gains or losses on the returns to capital, 
land, and labor, often distinguishing between skilled and unskilled wages. These 
projections of factor incomes are based on hypotheses about perfectly functioning 
markets within countries, which are not always realistic in practice. However, even 
granting the accuracy of the forecasts for unskilled wages, further analysis is necessary: 
some unskilled workers work more hours, or live in larger, multi-earner households, 
resulting in higher per capita incomes, while others receive correspondingly less. Thus 
the accuracy of a poverty reduction forecast depends not only on the underlying trade 
model, but also on the data manipulation required to estimate the resulting changes in the 
household income distribution. The impacts of economic growth on inequality and 
poverty turn out to depend quite sensitively on data definitions and measurement issues 
(Adams 2004). 
 
Anderson et al. 
 
The LINKAGE model discussed in section 1 has been extended to estimate the 
change in the real wage of unskilled workers. This allows the calculation of the number 
of people who would be moved past the poverty line, relying on previously calculated 
World Bank “poverty elasticities” – the percent change in the number of people in 
poverty for each 1% growth in average income – for each region of the world (Anderson 
et al. 2005b). The results are shown in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. Estimates of Poverty Reduction (Anderson) 
(millions of people) 
 
South Asia  sub-Saharan 
Africa 
World 
   
$2 per day poverty line 
Reduction due to likely Doha scenario  2.3  0.5  6.2 
Reduction due to full liberalization  9.6  20.4  65.6 
Baseline: extent of poverty 912.2  612.2  1946.3 
$1 per day poverty line 
Reduction due to likely Doha scenario  1.4  0.5  2.5 
Reduction due to full liberalization  5.6  21.1  31.9 
Baseline: extent of poverty  215.9 339.5 622.0 
 
Using the $2 per day poverty line, full merchandise trade liberalization would lift 
an estimated 66 million people out of poverty as of 2015, of whom 10 million are in 
South Asia and 20 million are in sub-Saharan Africa. For the world as a whole, this 
would represent a 3.4% reduction in poverty. The scenario for the likely results of the 
Doha round would reduce worldwide poverty by only 6 million people as of 2015, or 
0.3% of global poverty. Using the lower $1 per day poverty line, full liberalization would 





would reduce poverty by 2.5 million people, or 0.4% worldwide. As the authors note, 
“This corresponds to the relatively modest ambitions of the merchandise trade reforms as 




Using a different methodology, William Cline has produced a much larger, and 
widely discussed, estimate of the impact of trade liberalization on poverty (Cline 2004b). 
As shown in Table 8, his central estimate is a reduction in poverty of 438 million people, 
including massive poverty reduction in South Asia.
2 Although his study is responsible for 
much of the current interest in trade and poverty, it unfortunately relies on dated and 
questionable approaches to the problem. A recalculation of his results using a slightly 
different technical judgment comes coincidentally close to matching the findings of 
Anderson et al. 
 
Table 8: Estimates of Poverty Reduction (Cline) 
 







Main model forecast  30  19  98 
Productivity effect  98  1  156 
Capital growth effect  122  26  184 
    
Central case total  250  46  438 
Central case, Weisbrot recalculation  10  34  79 
 
Cline's results depend in part on the Harrison-Rutherford-Tarr CGE model and the 
GTAP 5 database, reflecting the state of the world as of 1997-98. Thus “future” 
opportunities for liberalization in his model include the completion of the Uruguay 
Round, as well as China's accession to the WTO, the expansion of the European Union, 
and the elimination of textile tariffs and quotas. So it is not surprising that his estimates 
of the benefits from complete liberalization, 0.93% of GDP worldwide and 1.35% of 
GDP for developing countries, are much higher than the estimates discussed in section 1. 
 
Two additional sources of poverty reduction are included along with the main 
CGE model estimates. First, Cline reviews other studies of the relationship between trade 
and income growth, concluding that a 1% increase in the ratio of trade to GDP leads to 
productivity increases creating, on average, a 0.5% increase in per capita incomes. This is 
the “productivity effect” shown in table 8. Second, since trade liberalization increases the 
return on capital, Cline performs a modified run of his CGE model, allowing the capital 
stock to grow enough to keep the rate of return on capital constant. This shows that with a 
huge infusion of capital into developing countries, incomes could rise by an impressive 
amount. Cline assumes that in the long run, trade liberalization would lead to half of this 
capital stock growth, along with the associated income gains.  





It seems possible that these two effects are double counting the same 
phenomenon. A big increase in the capital stock would be expected to increase labor 
productivity; if both effects are included, the productivity growth should be restricted to 
the amount that is independent of or additional to the effects of capital stock growth. 
 
Cline then has to translate changes in incomes into reductions in the number of 
people in poverty. He assumes that each country's income distribution follows a 
lognormal distribution – that is, the logarithms of individual incomes are normally 
distributed. The lognormal distribution provides a credible, rough approximation of many 
income distributions, although the fit is far from being perfect in every case. However, 
there are two problems that emerge in his treatment of the data, as identified by Mark 
Weisbrot et al. in a recent critique (Weisbrot et al. 2004). 
 
First, Weisbrot et al. point out, and Cline has acknowledged on his web site (Cline 
2004a), that Cline made an algebraic mistake in his original work on the lognormal 
distribution. The result of this correction is to lower the number of people lifted out of 
poverty by about 100 million; the figures in Table 8 are the corrected estimates, not the 
higher ones that Cline originally published. 
 
Second, Weisbrot et al. argue that there are at least two equally logical ways to fit 
a lognormal distribution to a country's income data. The alternative not taken by Cline 
would yield a dramatically lower estimate of poverty reduction, only 79 million 
worldwide, making no other changes in Cline's methodology. The Weisbrot recalculation 
of Cline's central case, shown in the last line of Table 8, is coincidentally reasonably 
close to the Anderson et al. calculation of the reduction in poverty from full trade 
liberalization, as seen in Table 7 (using the $2 per day poverty line, as Cline does). 
 
Moreover, Weisbrot et al. observe that the headcount measure of poverty 
reduction used by Cline, and by many other studies, simply counts the number of people 
moved from anything under the poverty line to anything over the line. While the phrase 
“poverty reduction” may suggest a qualitative transformation in economic circumstances, 
the model results more often imply a change of pennies per day, moving people from just 
below to just above $2 – valuable to be sure, but incremental rather than transformative.  
 
Specifically, Weisbrot et al. calculate the average incomes of the people lifted out 
of poverty in Cline's central case in 17 countries. Only in two of the countries, Pakistan 
and Thailand, is the pre-liberalization income of this population below $1.88 per day, or 
the post-liberalization income above $2.13 per day. In India, the people moved out of 
poverty go from $1.93 to $2.08 per day; in Bangladesh, the comparable movement is 
only from $1.97 to $2.03 per day.  
 
Moving tens of millions of people just across the poverty line, the effect of 
complete trade liberalization according to both the Anderson et al. study and the Weisbrot 
et al. recalculation of Cline's work, would of course be preferable to leaving people just 





millions of people out of poverty, which launched the discussion of trade liberalization as 
an anti-poverty measure. 
 
 
3. A different model 
 
Among the major CGE models used to estimate the effects of trade liberalization, 
the Brown-Deardorff-Stern (BDS) model stands out from the rest (Brown et al. 2002). 
While using the GTAP data set and sharing many common assumptions and approaches, 
it parts company with the models discussed above in two important respects: it relies on 
“new trade theory” and assumes increasing returns in manufacturing; and it incorporates 
estimates for the benefits from liberalization of trade in services.  
 
New trade theory and increasing returns 
 
The BDS model projects net losses, for the world as a whole, from agricultural 
liberalization, and enormous gains from manufacturing liberalization. A 33% reduction in 
agricultural protection is estimated to cause worldwide losses of $8 billion, while a 33% 
reduction in manufacturing tariffs is expected to produce a gain of $267 billion. The 
manufacturing number is unusually large (especially for one-third, rather than full, 
liberalization), in part because this is an older projection, still counting as available future 
benefits the results of liberalization that has already occurred by 2005. However, it is 
even larger than other estimates of the same vintage; and the estimate of net worldwide 
losses from agricultural liberalization is unique. These “outlier” results can be traced to 
the manner in which BDS implements new trade theory. 
 
Traditional trade theory, as it is usually applied in GTAP and many other models, 
assumes constant returns to scale in all industries: doubling production means precisely 
doubling income, costs, and profits. The “new trade theory,” so named when it was new, 
some 20 to 30 years ago, breaks with this tradition and assumes that there are economies 
of scale in many export industries. Empirical research motivated by new trade theory has 
confirmed the existence of increasing returns in many, though not all, branches of US 
manufacturing (Antweiler and Trefler 2002). When an industry experiences – increasing 
returns, doubling production leads to less than doubling of costs, implying more than 
doubling of net incomes.  
 
Elementary microeconomics demonstrates that perfect competition is unstable in 
an industry with increasing returns; instead, imperfect competition, such as oligopoly, is 
the norm. Under these conditions, as Paul Krugman pointed out in an early review of new 
trade theory (Krugman 1987), laissez-faire outcomes are no longer optimal, and there is 
no theoretical basis for rejecting all government intervention. Models based on new trade 
theory simply show, according to Krugman, that free trade is better than no trade; they 
unfortunately provide no guidance in identifying the forms of government intervention 
that would be welfare-enhancing, relative to the free market.  





The assumption of increasing returns in leading sectors of the economy is a 
foundation of the infant industry argument for strategic uses of trade protection. Alice 
Amsden and others have argued that trade protection and other forms of intervention 
have been essential to virtually all past successes in industrialization (Amsden 2001). 
Although most economists are now firmly committed to free trade, there is a long 
intellectual history to the debate, and interest in the issue outside of academia has not 
entirely vanished (Irwin 1996), (Ackerman 2004). 
 
It is all the more remarkable, therefore, that the use of new trade theory in the 
BDS model increases the estimated benefits of free trade. The infant industry argument is 
a dynamic application of increasing returns to scale, suggesting that under some 
circumstances, defying the market's short run judgment could pay off in the long run. In 
contrast, BDS offers a static analysis of increasing returns. In static terms, the market's 
short run judgment is all that matters; there will always be an immediate gain from 
expanding a country's strongest existing industries.  
 
BDS shares with most other CGE models both the static nature of the analysis, 
and the fixed level of total employment that is assumed to prevail both before and after 
trade policy changes. It is the combination of these characteristics, along with increasing 
returns in manufacturing but not agriculture, which explains the BDS finding of losses 
from agricultural liberalization.  
 
Liberalization of agricultural trade means that some countries expand agricultural 
output; the fixed employment assumption means that agriculture must draw labor out of 
other sectors such as manufacturing. As a result, manufacturing contracts and loses more 
than proportionally, due to economies of scale in reverse. At the same time, agriculture 
expands but gains only proportionally to the increase in inputs. Thus the net change in 
national income can be negative, even when trade policy is expanding a country's 
agricultural markets. Conversely, liberalization of manufacturing trade draws labor out of 
agriculture, with its constant returns, and expands industry with increasing returns – 
adding an extra bounce to the economic benefits of liberalization. 
  
Other modelers who have experimented with increasing returns have commented 
on this effect as an undesirable artifact of the models (Francois et al. 2003; Bouet et al. 
2004). Unlike BDS, their models do not imply global losses from agricultural 
liberalization. It is possible that BDS has assumed more rapidly increasing returns than 
other models, exaggerating the apparent losses in industry when agriculture expands and 




In view of the importance of services in upcoming trade negotiations, it seems 
appealing to extend the trade models to include the benefits of liberalization in this area. 
Unfortunately, the necessary data for CGE modeling are largely nonexistent; tariffs and 
quotas play a very small role in service industries, and the negotiations are not mainly 





the CGE apparatus, it is necessary to create “tariff equivalent” numbers for service 
sectors, which can then be “reduced” in modeling liberalization. 
 
Two CGE models have incorporated services liberalization, adopting very 
different modeling strategies and coming up with very different estimates of the available 
benefits. Francois et al. used a modified version of GTAP to find that full liberalization of 
services trade might produce $53 billion of benefits (Francois et al. 2003). According to 
BDS, on the other hand, a 33% reduction in barriers to services trade would produce 
$427 billion of global benefits (Brown et al. 2002); tripling this figure to approximate full 
liberalization suggests that it could be worth $1281 billion to BDS, fully 24 times the 
estimate from Francois et al.  
 
Francois et al. observe that the discussion of services liberalization “seems to 
confuse FDI [foreign direct investment] and migration with international trade. As a 
result, efforts to quantify market access in service sectors (a basic requirement if we want 
to then quantify liberalization) have been problematic at best.” (Francois et al. 2003, 5) 
Their solution to the problem begins by estimating a “gravity equation” predicting each 
country's imports for each service sector as a function of per capita income, population, 
and a dummy for EU membership. The tariff equivalent is then based on the ratio of 
actual to predicted imports, modified by the sector's demand elasticity. 
 
The BDS approach begins with gross operating margins, i.e. the difference 
between total revenues and total operating costs, for each service sector and country. In 
each sector, the country with the smallest gross operating margin is assumed to be freely 
open to foreign firms; the excess in other countries above the minimum gross operating 
margin is assumed to be the result of trade barriers. A critique of an earlier version of the 
BDS model found that Australia was generally the country with the lowest gross 
operating margins, and that the BDS methodology implied that the US had higher barriers 
to services trade than the EU, Japan, Korea, or Mexico (Dorman 2001). At that time, the 
model implied that complete elimination of barriers to trade in the service sector would 
lower prices paid by US consumers by more than 25%. 
 
It is not intuitively obvious that either of these approaches is reliable, or that one 
is preferable to the other, although the finding of extremely high US service sector 
“tariffs” might lead to doubts about the BDS methodology. Hertel and Keeney mention 
the Francois et al. estimates, referring to them as “highly speculative”; they see them as 
increasing the GTAP estimate of global benefits of complete liberalization by $66 billion, 
“with the lion's share going to high-income countries.” (Hertel and Keeney 2005, 17-18) 
A prudent conclusion might be that there is no solid basis for CGE estimation of the 
benefits of services liberalization at this time. 
 
 
4. Other benefits  
 
Two additional categories of benefits have been important in recent modeling and 





al., who incorporate these benefits into their model, trade facilitation measures “are 
meant to target less transparent trade barriers, such as customs procedures, product 
standards and conformance certifications, licensing requirements, and related 
administrative sources of trading costs.” As they observe, “the estimates of trading costs 
[imposed by such barriers] are very rough (at best).” (Francois et al. 2003, 5) Based on a 
few available studies, they apparently assume that trade facilitation could remove barriers 
equal to 3% of the value of trade. Almost nothing is said about the policies that would 
accomplish trade facilitation, or the feasibility, cost, or timetable for such measures. 
Francois et al. estimate that under full liberalization, trade facilitation measures could 
yield $151 billion of benefits worldwide, almost identical to the same study's total 
estimate for merchandise trade liberalization. 
 
Hertel and Keeney also examine trade facilitation measures, lowering trading 
costs for developing countries by assuming that they are brought halfway to the global 
average in port facilities, customs and regulatory procedures, and e-commerce. (It is not 
clear that they are considering the same trade facilitation measures as Francois et al.; the 
measures discussed by Hertel and Keeney sound somewhat less procedural and more 
infrastructural.) Hertel and Keeney find that trade facilitation would add $110 billion of 
benefits to the GTAP estimates, and that these benefits would be heavily skewed toward 
developing countries. They add, “However, unlike trade policy reform, which has few 
direct economic costs, trade facilitation requires substantial investments in infrastructure, 
ports and customs personnel. As such, that gross flow of benefits must be weighed 
against the potential upfront costs.” (Hertel and Keeney 2005, 19) 
 
Along similar lines, Jeffrey Sachs has identified geographic isolation and high 
transportation costs as one of the obstacles to development for the world's poorest 
countries (Sachs 2005). He emphasizes the need for substantial foreign aid to pay for the 
infrastructure of “trade facilitation” – along with a broader agenda of public health and 
education investments. While there are excellent arguments for such investments, there 
is, as Hertel and Keeney suggest, no reason to think that the benefits of trade facilitation 




A final benefit category is frequently appended to CGE based studies. Trade 
liberalization is often said to have an effect on productivity, over and above the effects 
captured in CGE models. Cline includes such an effect, in the study discussed in section 
2. Anderson et al. also consider such an effect, reporting that it would increase their 
estimate of global gains from merchandise trade liberalization by one third, with the 
benefits differentially favoring developing countries.  
 
While reported in the same publications as CGE model results, these productivity 
effects are off-line calculations, not part of the model per se. As seen with Cline, the 
analyst often reviews the available literature on productivity and trade, deriving a simple 
ratio or expected effect. If this effect were entirely separate from the effect tracked by the 





underlying literature would be required to ensure that the productivity effect seen in the 
other studies has not already been included. The interindustry shifts that result from 
liberalization, the core results of most CGE trade models, will themselves boost average 
productivity. The danger of double counting is even greater in the case of LINKAGE, 
which explicitly includes 14 years of dynamic effects. Is there really a wall between the 
dynamic effects that are endogenous to the model, and the dynamic effects that are 
reflected in the literature on productivity, forming the basis for the off-line calculations? 
 
Moreover, there are no built-in constraints ensuring the reasonableness of the 
productivity calculations; unlike CGE estimates, they are not required to be consistent 
with other calculations. A review article by Anderson illustrates the astonishing upside 
potential for off-line productivity calculations (Anderson 2004). After summarizing 
major CGE estimates of the benefits of liberalization, Anderson casually observes that 
there are additional dynamic gains from trade; the experiences of Korea, China, India, 
and Chile “suggest that trade opening immediately boosts GDP growth rates by several 
percentage points.” In order “to err on the conservative side," he assumes that trade 
liberalization boosts GDP growth rates by one sixth for developed countries and one third 
for developing countries. Almost as an afterthought, he adds that "those rates are assumed 
to continue to 2050,” or 45 years after the base year of his calculations (Anderson 2004, 
559). The present value for the 45-year stream of expected benefits is $23 trillion for his 
“optimistic Doha” scenario, or $46 trillion for full liberalization. “Even if the benefits 
ceased after fifty years,” he observes, this would be quite valuable (Anderson 2004, 567-
568). A response to his article notes that even the best economic policies do not always 
produce results that endure undiminished for 45 or 50 years (Pronk 2004). 
 
Such calculations suggest the vast uncertainty associated with ad hoc estimation 
of dynamic effects. CGE models, despite other limitations, do enforce a consistent 
framework that deduces effects from first principles, and prevents double counting. In 
off-line productivity calculations, on the other hand, there are no obvious limits; why stop 
at only 45 years? To systematize this discussion, there is a clear need for a dynamic 
model of trade and productivity, as difficult as it may be to develop one.  
 
 
5. Limitations of economic modeling 
 
The models of trade liberalization discussed in this paper are computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) models. They incorporate interactions among all sectors of the 
economy, not just the ones of immediate interest; they reflect supply and demand 
balances, and resource and budget constraints, in all markets simultaneously. Their name 
suggests a link to one of the most imposingly abstract branches of economics, general 
equilibrium theory, although in practice applied modelers do not use much of the theory 
beyond the idea that all markets clear at once. 
 
The comprehensiveness of coverage of the economy is the good news about CGE 
models: they offer a systematic framework for analyzing price and quantity interactions 





double counted. The bad news about the models also stems from their 
comprehensiveness: in order to provide such complete coverage of the economy, they 
rely on debatable theoretical simplifications, and impose enormous information 
requirements (Ackerman and Gallagher 2004).  
 
Any modeling exercise involves simplification of reality. The question is not 
whether simplifications are involved, but whether those simplifications clarify or distort 
the underlying reality. Unfortunately, in the case of CGE models of international trade, it 
is all too clear that model structures and assumptions introduce unintended distortions 
into the results. Three examples of such distortions are discussed here: the problem of 
“Armington elasticities”; the choice of static versus dynamic frameworks; and the 
assumption of fixed total employment. 
 
One of the important but technical aspects of CGE trade models involves the use 
of Armington elasticities. Following a procedure developed by economist Paul 
Armington, the models use a set of elasticities first, to apportion a country's demand for a 
specific good – such as US demand for paper – between domestic production and 
imports, and then to distribute the demand for imports among the countries that export 
that good. Although convenient for the process of calculation, this procedure imposes the 
implausible assumptions that every exporter produces a differentiated product and has 
some degree of market power (even for bulk commodities), and that even if prices 
change, no country ever shifts completely from importing to exporting a commodity, or 
vice versa (Tokarick 2005). While considerable research effort has gone into estimation 
of Armington elasticities, substantial uncertainties and hence wide confidence intervals 
remain in the latest estimates, particularly for key commodities such as wheat and rice 
(Hertel et al. 2004). Such uncertainties have proved to be of more than academic 
importance; rival analyses of a proposed free-trade agreement between the US and 
Australia came to opposite conclusions about whether or not it would be beneficial for 
Australia, based largely on their use of different Armington elasticities (ACIL Consulting 
2003; Centre for International Economics 2003). 
  
Another limitation is the static nature of CGE analyses. Most models offer only a 
comparison of two snapshots, an equilibrium that is assumed to have existed before a 
policy change, and an equilibrium reached after the policy change. The length and cost of 
the transition, an issue of great practical political significance, is outside the scope of 
most models. Moreover, the static version of new trade theory, as seen in section 3, 
excludes the innovative aspects of the original, dynamic theory. Crucial dynamic 
questions, such as the viability of “infant industry” development strategies, simply cannot 
be addressed in a static framework. In this respect, CGE models follow the lead of 
general equilibrium theory, which has achieved elegant and definitive static results but 
has led primarily to mathematical paradoxes when extended to dynamic analysis 
(Ackerman 2002). 
 
A partial exception to the static orientation of most CGE models is the World 
Bank's LINKAGE model, discussed above. It begins with a description of the world 





that the effects of trade policy may take time to be felt, and allows growth to be faster in 
some parts of the world than others. However, three arbitrary assumptions are imposed in 
order to calculate growth paths: government fiscal balances (deficits or surpluses) are 
fixed at their base year level, with taxes on households assumed to change as needed to 
meet this objective; current account balances are fixed, with exchange rates assumed to 
change as needed to maintain the balances; and “investment is savings driven” (Anderson 
et al. 2005a). The first two assumptions ensure that two of the most important and 
variable indicators of macroeconomic performance are artificially held constant for every 
country; the third assumption echoes Say's Law, the tenet of classical economics that 
rules out unemployment and underinvestment. In short, LINKAGE moves beyond the 
usual CGE snapshots of comparative statics, only to provide an album of 14 annual 
snapshots based on artificially perfect macroeconomic stability. 
 
For policymakers, the most important theoretical limitation of CGE models is 
their silence on the employment impacts of trade liberalization. Much of the political 
passion surrounding trade policy reflects the hopes and fears about its effects on 
employment. In developing countries, will access to new export markets allow workers to 
move out of disguised unemployment in very low productivity, informal sector 
occupations, into formal employment in higher productivity, modern sectors of the 
economy? In developed countries, will loss of protection for declining industries lead to 
unemployment of workers whose limited education and/or geographical location makes it 
hard to retrain them for other jobs? Most CGE models are silent by design on these 
fundamental, controversial questions. 
 
This issue is highlighted in a literature review by Joseph Stiglitz and Ed Charlton, 
who write that the standard analysis of the benefits of trade liberalization “... is predicated 
on a set of assumptions that is not satisfied in most developing countries: full 
employment, perfect competition, and perfect capital and risk markets” (Stiglitz and 
Charlton 2004, 7). They list a series of problems with CGE models that affect the 
analysis of developing countries, including among others: 
•  “CGE models often do not account for the presence of persistent unemployment 
in developing countries. In the presence of unemployment, trade liberalization 
may simply move workers from low productivity protected sectors into 
unemployment.” 
•  “... most of the tools used to analyze general equilibrium effects of trade 
liberalization are static models. They describe the movement from one 'steady 
state' to another but do not incorporate the costs associated with transition or the 
consequences for economies which are initially out of steady state.” 
•  “CGE models do not address the fact that implementation and adjustment costs 
are likely to be larger in developing countries.” (Stiglitz and Charlton 2004, 8-9) 
 
In response, CGE modelers point out that they typically assume fixed 
employment, not necessarily full employment.
3 However, this still does not allow 
analysis of changes in employment. Each country's level of unemployment after the 
policy innovation is, by assumption, the same as the level before, even if it is not always 





contract industries, but it cannot increase or decrease unemployment. Workers can and 
will change industries, but they are playing musical chairs with exactly enough chairs for 
everyone who had a seat before the music started. Less metaphorically, fixed 
employment models cannot confirm or deny the much-feared migration of jobs to China 
as a result of trade liberalization; rather, the models have assumed in advance that such 
job flight is impossible. 
 
In effect, the question that fixed-employment models are answering is, “What 
would be the effects of the interindustry shifts resulting from trade liberalization, if every 
country's workers retain exactly the number of jobs they had before, but are free to move 
between industries as needed?” This is one question about trade impacts, but it is far from 
the only one. Except among economists, it is unlikely to seem like the obvious place to 
start when thinking about trade. 
 
An understanding of this limitation of the models may help make sense of the 
results presented above. The model results have nothing to do with any change, up or 
down, in overt or disguised unemployment; by hypothesis, none is possible. Rather, they 
are all about the price changes, and the resulting interindustry shifts, that would occur 
within a fixed employment economy. This is why the gains to consumers from tariff 
reductions dominate the model estimates of the benefits of liberalization: producer 
impacts, positive or negative, have been largely suppressed by assumption. If Europe 
eliminates trade barriers and increases food imports, European farmers are assumed to 
find jobs elsewhere; there is no net loss of employment in Europe. Likewise, there is no 
net gain of employment in the countries that expand their exports of food to Europe. No 
such artificial assumptions limit the estimated gains to European consumers, who now 
enjoy the full benefit of lower prices. In short, fixed-employment models tilt toward a full 
accounting of consumer impacts but a muted assessment of producer impacts, since 
everyone affected by trade is either coming from or going to a job elsewhere. The 
dominant role of consumer benefits is not so much a research finding, as a reflection of 
the loss of the other side of the equation. The oddity is that producer impacts were lost by 
design. 
 
While the fixed employment assumption is conventional, it is not required for 
CGE modeling. Two recent articles have explored both the possibility and the desirability 
of calculating employment impacts of trade in a CGE framework (Kurzweil 2002; 
Oslington 2005). Some recent studies done for the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD), using GTAP, have modeled trade liberalization under the 
assumption that the employment of unskilled labor in developing countries can vary as 
needed. This is done by changing the model algorithms so that wages remain fixed while 
the quantity of unskilled labor may vary. The fixed wage assumption is not totally 
satisfactory, as one would expect some movement in both the price and quantity of labor, 
but the authors claim that the pool of unemployed or underemployed in developing 
countries implies most of the adjustment occurs in employment rather than wages. 
 
In one such study, the elimination of all industrial tariffs would lead to estimated 





Africa, and the Middle East, as well as in Central America and the Caribbean; elsewhere 
in Latin America, unskilled employment would increase by about 2%. The assumption of 
variable unskilled employment, compared to a conventional analysis with fixed 
employment, would add $40 billion to the global benefits from complete industrial trade 
liberalization. Most countries and regions would enjoy small increases in benefits, while 
more than 70% of the total increase would go to China. The estimated benefits of partial 
liberalization were naturally smaller (Fernández de Córdoba and Vanzetti 2005). 
 
The UNCTAD study, however, represents only a partial correction to the 
unrealistic assumption of fixed employment. It leaves unchanged, by definition, both the 
number of jobs in developed countries, and the number of skilled jobs in developing 
countries. In the case of industrial liberalization, skilled jobs in some developing 
countries would indeed be at risk; some of the countries gaining unskilled employment 
thanks to increased agricultural or raw material exports might simultaneously be losing 
industrial jobs that were formerly protected by tariffs. Thus the net job gains, combining 
skilled and unskilled labor, might well be smaller than the UNCTAD projections. 
 
Another modeling group, at the French research institute CEPII, has applied a 
different CGE model, MIRAGE, to agricultural trade liberalization in the Doha round 
(Bouet et al. 2004). Their model employs a number of innovations, including a new, 
detailed data set for agricultural tariffs and trade policies, the assumption of imperfect 
competition in industry and services, and a dual labor market in developing countries 
structured much like the UNCTAD model (with a totally elastic supply of unskilled labor 
at fixed wages), among other features.  
 
Under their “likely Doha” scenario, the gains from agricultural trade liberalization 
amount to just $18 billion worldwide, as shown in Table 9. The developed world would 
receive benefits of $19 billion, while gains of about $1 billion each for China and for 
South Asia would be outweighed by losses of $3 billion for the rest of the developing 
world. Although this is a more discouraging outlook than most CGE forecasts offer for 
developing countries, its global total is roughly comparable to the extrapolated GTAP 
Doha scenario, presented in Table 6.
4 In their sensitivity analyses, the CEPII analysts 
Table 9. Doha scenario for agriculture (MIRAGE) 
 
  gain or loss 
($1997 billions) 
percent of GDP 
 
Developed countries  19.0  0.06% 
  
China 1.3  0.15% 
South Asia  0.9  0.17% 
Rest of World  -3.0  -0.06% 
  
World total  18.2  0.06% 
 
Source:(Bouet et al. 2004), Table 6, page 27. 





attributed their finding of limited gains from liberalization primarily to their new data set 
for tariffs and trade policies; the flexible employment assumption made the outcome of 





The numerical rhetoric supporting trade liberalization, the benefit of hundreds of 
billions of dollars to the developing world that roared through trade policy debates as 
recently as 2003, has suddenly quieted to a whisper. For the world's less affluent citizens, 
for developing countries with many people living on $1 or $2 per day, CGE models of 
trade liberalization offer a penny per person per day in some variants, and as little as one 
quarter of a penny from some forecasts of the likely effects of the Doha round. Small 
wonder, then, that the effects of trade liberalization on global poverty turn out to be much 
less than originally advertised. 
 
Modelers have tried with limited success to broaden the discussion, to discover 
other categories of benefits that could be brought into the same framework. Liberalization 
of services does not fit comfortably into trade models; for the most part, there are no 
service tariffs, making it hard to apply methods developed for merchandise trade 
analyses. Trade facilitation measures, in part a new name for infrastructure, may well be 
useful but will not be cheap; real investments, not just negotiations, are required. 
Hypothetical long-term productivity gains from trade liberalization remain open-ended 
and speculative, only loosely attached to the underlying CGE models of tariffs and short-
term trade flows. 
 
The failure of CGE trade models goes deeper than their inability to produce the 
expected huge forecasts of benefits for developing countries. On a conceptual level, they 
fail to offer a useful, comprehensive framework for thinking about and measuring the 
important effects of trade. Despite all its complexity, the theoretical apparatus ironically 
enforces arbitrary, undesired simplifications, from the esoterica of Armington elasticities 
and the rigidities of static analysis, to the central flaw of ignoring employment effects by 
design. The employment-related questions that policymakers care most about cannot be 
answered within the standard CGE framework, because they cannot even be asked. 
Consumer benefits from tariff reductions are highlighted, while producer impacts of trade 
policy are obscured, by the assumptions made before the models are built and applied. 
 
Promising initial steps have been taken toward modeling with variable 
employment; what would happen if this approach were carried to its logical conclusion? 
In general, modeling of variable employment throughout the economies of both 
developing and developed countries might be expected to amplify the results of 
conventional CGE models. Those who gain somewhat from trade, in the context of a 
fixed employment model, would often gain more in a model that included realistic 
variation in employment. Those who lose somewhat from trade, under fixed employment 
assumptions, would lose even more if their trade related industries decline. The effect 





of consumer benefits from lower prices would be reduced. But the results would be more 
informative and useful than those that are available at present. An adequate economic 
analysis, modeling the full range of effects of trade that are of interest to policymakers 
and the public, would combine consumer and producer impacts in a unified framework. 
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 ENDNOTES  
                                                 
1 These per capita figures are slight overestimates, since they are ratios of benefits in 2015 to population in 
2001; with the larger population expected by 2015, the per capita benefit would be smaller. 
2 Cline's high case, not shown or discussed here, substitutes forecasts from a much simpler and more 
experimental agricultural model for a significant part of the CGE results. Cline himself comments on the 
substantial uncertainty surrounding the results of the agricultural model; see (Cline 2004b), 163-68. 
3 Personal communication, David Vanzetti, July 2005. 
4 The MIRAGE forecast in Table 9, of $18 billion of global gains, refers to liberalization in agriculture 
only; the GTAP extrapolation in Table 6, with $28 billion of gains, refers to liberalization of all trade. Note 
that the figures in Table 9 correct an apparent small error in the world total line in the original source; the 
world total in Table 9 is consistent with both sets of regional detail data in the original.  
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